

学校编码: 10384  
学号: 15720081151972

分类号\_\_\_\_密级\_\_\_\_  
UDC\_\_\_\_

厦 门 大 学

硕 士 学 位 论 文

后危机时代美国对华新贸易保护主义  
的政治经济学分析

The Political Economy of the United States New Trade  
Protectionism against China in the Post-Crisis Era

孙 娜

指导教师姓名: 黄 建 忠 教 授  
专 业 名 称: 国 际 贸 易 学  
论文提交日期: 2011 年 04 月  
论文答辩时间: 2011 年 05 月  
学位授予日期: 2011 年 06 月

答辩委员会主席: \_\_\_\_\_  
评 阅 人: \_\_\_\_\_

2011 年 06 月

## 厦门大学学位论文原创性声明

本人呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下,独立完成的研究成果。本人在论文写作中参考其他个人或集体已经发表的研究成果,均在文中以适当方式明确标明,并符合法律规范和《厦门大学研究生学术活动规范(试行)》。

另外,该学位论文为( )课题(组)的研究成果,获得( )课题(组)经费或实验室的资助,在( )实验室完成。(请在以上括号内填写课题或课题组负责人或实验室名称,未有此项声明内容的,可以不作特别声明。)

声明人(签名):

年 月 日

## 厦门大学学位论文著作权使用声明

本人同意厦门大学根据《中华人民共和国学位条例暂行实施办法》等规定保留和使用此学位论文，并向主管部门或其指定机构送交学位论文（包括纸质版和电子版），允许学位论文进入厦门大学图书馆及其数据库被查阅、借阅。本人同意厦门大学将学位论文加入全国博士、硕士学位论文共建单位数据库进行检索，将学位论文的标题和摘要汇编出版，采用影印、缩印或者其它方式合理复制学位论文。

本学位论文属于：

（        ）1. 经厦门大学保密委员会审查核定的保密学位论文，  
于        年        月        日解密，解密后适用上述授权。

（        ）2. 不保密，适用上述授权。

（请在以上相应括号内打“√”或填上相应内容。保密学位论文应是已经厦门大学保密委员会审定过的学位论文，未经厦门大学保密委员会审定的学位论文均为公开学位论文。此声明栏不填写的，默认为公开学位论文，均适用上述授权。）

声明人（签名）：

年        月

厦门大学博硕士论文摘要库

## 摘 要

20 世纪 90 年代以来,随着中国的迅速崛起,中美关系逐渐成为影响世界和平与稳定的最重要的双边关系之一。与此同时,美国加紧了对中国采取贸易保护主义的步伐。特别是经历了全球金融危机之后,美国再次挥舞新贸易保护主义大棒,频繁对中国实施各种贸易保护措施,给我国的经济的发展带来了很大的负面影响。由于纯贸易经济理论无法解释贸易保护发生的根本原因,因此必须结合美国特有的政治体制进行分析,而贸易政策的政治经济学理论则将政治因素和经济因素相结合,试图对贸易政策的产生机制进行分析。然而,目前对后危机时代美国对华新贸易保护主义的研究还比较少,已有的文献大多是对美国对华贸易摩擦的理论评述或者是针对具体个案进行的较为宏观的分析,特别是缺乏对这些新贸易保护行为动因的系统分析。因此,研究后危机时代美国对华新贸易保护主义的动机和决策机制就具有非常重要的理论和现实意义。

具体来看,本文共分六章。第一章为导论,主要介绍本文研究的问题和意义,研究方法、思路、创新点及不足。第二章简要归纳了与本文相关的文献综述,包括新贸易保护主义的理论依据和贸易政策政治经济学的理论模型,为本文后续研究奠定了理论基础。第三章从现实的角度,捡取了后危机时代美国对华新贸易保护的主要行为,并重点分析了其表现形式和特征,为进一步挖掘这些行为特点背后的动因提供了现实依据。第四章重点从政治经济学的角度,系统地评述了美国对华贸易保护政策的决策过程及影响机制,并分别从决策机构、利益集团和外部制度三个层面对后危机时代美国对华贸易保护主义作出了解释。第五章作为第四章的补充,采用后危机时代的一个典型案例——中美轮胎特保案,结合政治经济学方法对美国对华贸易保护行为的本质进行分析,试图给读者以更加感性的认识。第六章首先在前文分析结论的基础上,预测了后危机时代美国对华贸易保护主义的发展趋势,然后从政府和企业的角度提出了我国应对美国新贸易保护主义的政策建议。

根据以上分析,本文得出的主要结论如下:

一是后危机时代,美国对华新贸易保护主义手段名目繁多,尤以中国的“非市场经济地位”、“两反两保”、国际劳工标准、环境保护为由征收的“碳关税”、人民币汇率等问题最多,并呈现出内容和形式上的多样性、范围的广泛性、动机的复杂性以及手段的

欺骗性等特点，这些也反映了今后美国对华贸易保护的发展趋势。

二是美国对华贸易保护政策的制定过程是美国政府部门及各种对立的利益集团之间进行多次相互博弈的结果，是一个综合了国内外政治经济因素的复杂过程。在决策的整个过程中，影响美国采取对华贸易保护主义的因素众多，本文从决策机构、利益集团和外部制度的因素上寻找原因，认为后危机时代，影响美国对华贸易保护主义的重要因素主要有：美国的政府决策部门、相关利益集团的游说活动、中国的崛起对美国全球战略的挑战、WTO 国际规则的例外条款的模糊性、金融危机使美国经济陷于衰退的现实、美中大量的贸易逆差等等。

三是根据上述分析，本文认为后危机时代的美国对华贸易保护主义将会长期存在，且中国仍会在相当长的时期内处于被动地位，但是美国与中国之间发生大规模贸易战的可能性很小，中美双边经贸关系的合作才是两国的发展大局。另外，中国在这场新的贸易保护浪潮中，虽然不能一时扭转被动局面，但仍可采取措施积极应对。例如充分利用 WTO 的争端解决机制，建立灵活的反贸易保护主义预警机制，加强同其他国家的沟通和交流，加快转变经济增长方式，优化产业结构等等。

**关 键 词：** 后危机时代；贸易保护；政治经济学；保护待售模型

## Abstract

Since the 90s of the 20th century, with the rapid rise of China, Sino-US relations have become one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Meanwhile, the U.S. trade protection against China has stepped up. Especially given the global financial crisis, the United States are waving the big stick of new trade protectionism once again, which has brought great negative impact on China's economic development. While purely trade and economic theory cannot explain the occurrence of the root causes of trade protection, the analysis must be combined with the use of the U.S. unique political system and use the theory of political economy. However, there still lack of the study about U.S. new trade protectionism of the current post-crisis era, and most of the existing literature is a return of theoretical review or about specific cases based on more macro analysis, especially lacking of system analysis on the motivation of behavior of the new trade protection. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the motives and decision-making mechanism of US trade protectionism both from theory and reality.

This dissertation is composed of six chapters. The first chapter gives a brief account of the importance of Sino-US trade relationship, and showing the motives and significance, research methods, ideas, innovation and deficiencies of this study. The second chapter briefly summarizes the relevant literature and research review, including the theoretical basis of new trade protectionism and trade policy model of political economy. The third chapter analyzes performance of U.S. trade protection from a realistic point of view. In order to further explore the motivation behind the behavior characteristics, they have provided a realistic basis. The fourth chapter gives a systematic review of the decision-making process and influence mechanisms of the U.S. trade policy based on the political economy theory. Separately from three levels: the decision-making bodies, interest groups and the external system, this paper made the interpretation of the U.S. trade protection. As a complement to the fourth chapter, the fifth chapter analyzes the nature conservation act of the U.S. trade protection against China using a typical case - U.S. safeguard action, trying to give the readers a more perceptual

awareness. The sixth chapter predicts the trend of post-crisis era's trade protection based on the previous conclusions, and then put forward our response from the perspective of government and business.

Based on the above analysis, the main conclusions are as follows:

Firstly, in the post-crisis era, the U.S. made trade protection acts against China in different forms. Such as China's "non-market economy status", "two against and two guarantees", International Labor Standards, impose "carbon tariff" on the grounds of environmental protection, the RMB exchange rate and other issues. They are showing the diversity of content and form, the broad scope, complexity of motive and the means of fraudulent and other characteristics, these also reflect future trends of the U.S. trade protection.

Secondly, the U.S. trade policy-making process is the game's result between the U.S. government and various interest groups. This article find the reasons from the decision-making bodies, interest groups and external factors of the system, and think the important factors are: the U.S. government departments, the relevant interest groups' lobbying activities, the rise of China making a challenge to the U.S. global strategy, the chance provided by WTO exceptional rules, the reality of U.S. economic recession made by the financial crisis and so on.

Thirdly, based on the above analysis, this paper think that the post-crisis era U.S. trade protectionism will remain long, and China will be in a passive position continually for a long time. But a large-scale trade war between U.S. and China occur unlikely. On the contrary, the trend will be the cooperation of economic and trade relations between the two countries. In addition, in this new wave of trade protection, China can still take measures to cope with, although it is not a time to reverse the passive situation. For example, to make full use of WTO dispute settlement mechanism, to establish a flexible mechanism for early warning against trade protectionism, to strengthen communication with other countries, to accelerate the transformation of economic growth, to optimize industrial structure and so on.

**Key words:** New Era of Post-Crisis; Trade Protection; Political Economy;

Protection For Sales Model



## 目 录

<b>1</b>	<b>导论</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	问题的提出及意义	1
1.2	研究的思路及方法	2
1.2.1	研究思路	2
1.2.2	研究方法	3
1.3	本文的创新与不足	4
1.3.1	本文的创新	4
1.3.2	本文的不足	5
<b>2</b>	<b>文献综述</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1	新贸易保护主义的传统依据	6
2.1.1	公平贸易理论	6
2.1.2	增加就业理论	6
2.1.3	环境保护理论	7
2.2	贸易政策政治经济学的理论研究	7
<b>3</b>	<b>美国对华新贸易保护主义的现状及特征分析</b>	<b>9</b>
3.1	新贸易保护主义的界定	11
3.2	美国对华新贸易保护主义的主要表现	11
3.2.1	“反倾销”和“反补贴”措施并用	12
3.2.2	“特殊保障措施”成为新型贸易保护手段	14
3.2.3	以气候议题为名征收“碳关税”	16
3.2.4	人民币汇率问题再成新话题	17
3.2.5	以国际劳工标准为名对华实施贸易保护	18
3.2.6	继续否认中国的“市场经济地位”	20
3.3	美国对华新贸易保护主义的特征分析	20
3.3.1	新贸易保护主义范围的广泛性和全球性	20
3.3.2	新贸易保护主义内容与形式的多样性	20

3.3.3 新贸易保护主义动机的复杂性.....	21
3.3.4 新贸易保护主义手段的欺骗性.....	21
<b>3.4 本章小结.....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>4 美国对华新贸易保护主义的政治经济学分析 .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>4.1 贸易保护政策的供求分析——基于扩展的 GH 模型.....</b>	<b>23</b>
4.1.1 美国贸易保护政策的供求分析.....	24
4.1.2 对美国对华实施贸易保护政策的讨论.....	29
<b>4.2 美国对华新贸易保护主义的决策机构因素分析 .....</b>	<b>30</b>
4.2.1 美国对外贸易政策决策的决策体系.....	30
4.2.2 美国决策机构在对华贸易保护主义问题上的影响分析.....	33
<b>4.3 美国对华新贸易保护主义的利益集团因素分析 .....</b>	<b>37</b>
4.3.1 利益集团在对华贸易政策上的不同阵营.....	37
4.3.2 利益集团游说美国对华贸易政策的主要渠道及方式.....	39
4.3.3 利益集团在美国对华新贸易保护主义上的表现及特点.....	41
<b>4.4 美国对华新贸易保护主义的制度因素分析.....</b>	<b>43</b>
4.4.1 美国的全球战略对中国的遏制.....	43
4.4.2 世贸组织的制度约束为美国贸易保护主义提供了可乘之机.....	44
4.4.3 金融危机造成的美国实体经济衰退、失业率居高不下.....	45
4.4.4 美中大量贸易逆差使美国处于双边关系的不利地位.....	45
<b>4.5 本章小结.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>5 美国对华新贸易保护主义的案例分析：中美轮胎特保案.....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>5.1 中美轮胎特保案的概况 .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>5.2 中美轮胎特保案的政治经济学分析 .....</b>	<b>50</b>
5.2.1 金融危机导致美国国内经济衰退、失业率上升.....	50
5.2.2 美国工会组织强大的游说能力.....	53
5.2.3 特保条款具有歧视性及实施的便利性.....	55
5.2.4 美国政府自身政治利益的需要.....	57
<b>5.3 本章小结.....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>6 中国应对新贸易保护主义的政策建议 .....</b>	<b>58</b>

---

6.1 后危机时代新贸易保护主义发展趋势及对中国的影响.....	58
6.2 中国应对新贸易保护主义的政策建议 .....	59
6.2.1 对中国政府的政策建议.....	59
6.2.2 对我国企业的政策建议.....	62
参考文献 .....	65
致谢.....	69

厦门大学博硕士论文摘要库

# Contents

<b>I</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Background and Significance	1
1.2	framework and methods	2
1.2.1	Framework	2
1.2.2	Methods	3
1.3	Innovation and Inadequacies	4
1.3.1	Innovation	4
1.3.2	Inadequacies	5
<b>II</b>	<b>Literature Review</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1	Traditional basis for the New Trade Protectionism	6
2.1.1	Fair Trade Theory	6
2.1.2	Increase Employment Theory	6
2.1.3	Environment Protection Theory	7
2.2	Theory of Political Economy of Trade Policy	7
<b>III</b>	<b>Situation and Features Analysis of the New U.S. Trade Protectionism</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1	The Definition of New trade protectionism	11
3.2	The Main Situation of the New U.S. Trade Protection against China	11
3.2.1	“Anti-Dumping” and “Anti-Subsidies” Investigation Simultaneously	12
3.2.2	Begin to Use "Special Safeguard Measures"	14
3.2.3	Impose "Carbon Tariff" As an Excuse of Environmental Protection	16
3.2.4	RMB Exchange Rate Issue to Be Focused Again	17
3.2.5	International Labor Standards	18
3.2.6	Denied that China's “Market Economy Status” Continually	20
3.3	The Analysis of the U.S. New Trade Protectionism Characteristics	20
3.3.1	The Broad Range	20
3.3.2	The Diversity of Content and Form	20

3.3.3 Complexity of Motive·····	21
3.3.4 The fraudulent of Means·····	21
<b>3.4 Chapter Summary·····</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>IV Political Economic analysis of the U.S. Trade Protectionism·····</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>4.1 Demand and Supply of Trade Protection Policies - Based on Extended GH Model·····</b>	<b>23</b>
4.1.1 Supply and Demand Analysis of the U.S. Trade Protection Policy·····	24
4.1.2 The Discussions on the U.S. Trade Protection Policy·····	29
<b>4.2 The Analysis of the U.S. Decision-Making Body ·····</b>	<b>30</b>
4.2.1 The Decision-Making System of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy ·····	30
4.2.2 The Impact Analysis of the United States Decision-Making Body ·····	33
<b>4.3 The Analysis of the Interest Groups·····</b>	<b>37</b>
4.3.1 The Different Camps of Interest Groups ·····	37
4.3.2 The Lobbying Channels and Means of Interest Group·····	39
4.3.3 The Performance and Characteristics of Interest Groups·····	41
<b>4.4 The Analysis of Institutional Factors·····</b>	<b>43</b>
4.4.1 The U.S. Global Strategy·····	43
4.4.2 WTO System Constraints·····	44
4.4.3 The U.S. Real Economy Recession Caused by Financial Crisis·····	45
4.4.4 Sino-US Trade Imbalance in the United States ·····	45
<b>4.5 Chapter Summary·····</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>V Case Study: The Case of Special Safeguard Sino-US Tire ·····</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>5.1 The Overview of Case·····</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>5.2 The Political Economic Analysis on the Case ·····</b>	<b>50</b>
5.2.1 The U.S. Real Economy Recession and Rising Unemployment Caused by Financial Crisis ·····	50
5.2.2 U.S. Labor Unions' Strong Lobbying Power·····	53
5.2.3 The Convenient and Discriminatory of Special Safeguard Provisions·····	55
5.2.4 U.S. Government Own Political Interests Needs·····	55

<b>5.3 Chapter Summary</b> .....	<b>57</b>
<b>VI China's Policy Proposals in Response to the New Trade Protectionism</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>6.1 The Trend of Trade Protectionism in the New Era of Post-Crisis</b> .....	<b>58</b>
<b>6.2 China's Policy Proposals in Response to the New Trade Protectionism</b> .....	<b>59</b>
6.2.1 Policy Proposals to Government.....	59
6.2.2 Policy Proposals to Enterprises.....	62
<b>References</b> .....	<b>65</b>
<b>Acknowledgement</b> .....	<b>69</b>

厦门大学博士论文摘要库



Degree papers are in the "[Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database](#)". Full texts are available in the following ways:

1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on <http://etd.calis.edu.cn/> and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library.
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to [etd@xmu.edu.cn](mailto:etd@xmu.edu.cn) for delivery details.

厦门大学博硕士论文摘要库